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Abstract
This paper compares alternative licensing schemes of a patentor, that is, at the same time, a
producer within an industry. The licensing scheme can assume the form of a royalty per unit
of output, a fixed fee, or a fixed fee with maximum authorized production. We show that,
when the innovation is non-drastic, in a duopolistic Cournot competition, the third method
dominates the others. As the patentor has strong incentives to limit the output of the
opponent, this practice must be carefully monitored by the antitrust authority.
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A patent gives a ￿rm the exclusive right to directly exploit an innovation or to license it to
other ￿rms. Licensing agreements are quite widespread practices in business as they are the
main source of income for an outside patent holder and an important source of additional
income to a patent holder participating in the production. The literature on licensing has
distinguished between two main cases depending on whether the patent holder is involved
in production or not (see, for example, Kamien, 1992).
When the innovator is not participating in the production, Kamien and Schwartz (1982),
Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986) and Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992) show that licensing
by means of a ￿xed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty (for the outside patent
holder). In fact, a royalty scheme generates lower patenting revenue with respect to a ￿xed
fee scheme, as royalties raise the marginal costs of production of the licensees and hence such
a scheme reduces the advantage of innovation (and the returns to the patent holder).
A second stream of research has analysed the case of a patent holder that is involved in
production. Wang (1998) shows that, in a Cournot duopoly, a royalty scheme can outperform
a ￿xed fee scheme when the cost-reducing innovation is non-drastic. Kamien and Tauman
(2002) have generalized this result in an oligopolistic context. In both cases, a royalty is
superior to a ￿xed fee as the innovator cares not only about the licensing revenue but also
about the returns of its direct sales. When a patenting-holder ￿rm chooses to license by
means of a royalty, it reduces the output of the opponent with respect to a ￿xed fee and it
increases its market share. The dominance of a royalty scheme rests on the fact that the
increase in pro￿ts due to a larger market share is higher than the reduction in licensing
revenue associated with the distortionary royalty payment.
Licensing agreements are often more complex than previously described. OECD (1989)
indicates that licensing agreements usually include territorial agreements, limitations on the
licensee￿ s quantity, quality controls, and many other restraints. Anand and Khanna (2000)
provide a recent analysis of the agreement contracts. Bessy et al. (2002) report that ￿xed-
fee agreements are often linked to maximum authorized production capacities. In Anderson
and Gallini (1998), there are many contributions describing exclusivity restrictions and other
licensing agreements in Europe and the US.
Although licensing restrictions are notorious, especially in the literature on patent licens-
ing and competition policy, there are few contributions which analyse the optimal licensing
scheme in complex environments. Some exceptions are Rey and Winter (1998) who study the
case of exclusivity restrictions, Rockett (1990) who studies the impact of quality restraints,
1and Gilbert and Shapiro (1997) who propose an analysis of vertical licensing restraints.
In this paper we investigate the optimality of the licensing schemes when a patent holder
can choose among three di⁄erent licensing agreements: a royalty per unit of output; a ￿xed
fee; or a ￿xed fee with a maximum authorized production.
We will show that the third licensing method dominates the previous ones. The expla-
nation of this result is straightforward. Licensing agreements produce a trade-o⁄ to the
patent-holding ￿rm which is participating in the production. The licensor gains from the
licensing payments but it loses pro￿ts as a result of increased competition.
The proposed licensing method makes this trade-o⁄clear. When ￿rm 1 sets the maximum
production level low, it can only ask for a small licensing payment, while, when it sets the
maximum production level high, it can ask for a large licensing payment. However, we
will show that the gains in pro￿ts due to a reduction of the competitive pressure always
dominate the reduction in the licensing payment. As licensing by means of a ￿xed-fee with
maximum production allows ￿rm 1 to reduce the output of the opponent more than with
other methods, this method maximizes the payo⁄ of the patent holder. In this context, the
patent holder has a strong incentive to limit the output of the opponent, and therefore these
practices must be carefully monitored by the antitrust authority1.
2 The Model
There are two ￿rms: namely, 1 and 2, engaged in Cournot quantity competition. They
produce an identical product and incur identical, constant unit costs c. The demand is
linear and given by Q = a ￿ p for p ￿ a, and Q = 0 for p > a, where Q refers to the
total quantity of the good demanded at the price p. We assume that ￿rm 1 has created
a new process which reduces the marginal costs of a ￿nal product by "; where 0 < " ￿ c.
The innovation is non-drastic, i.e. the post-invention monopoly price, pm = (a + c ￿ ")=2,
exceeds the pre-invention marginal costs, c. Firm 1 can license the process to ￿rm 2 by
means of one of the following licensing methods: a royalty per unit of output (R); a ￿xed
fee (F); or a ￿xed fee with maximum authorized production (A). In the ￿rst case, ￿rm 1
requires a constant payment rate r for each unit produced by ￿rm 2. In the second case,
￿rm 1 receives a ￿xed amount independently of the production of ￿rm 2. In the third case,
1This paper does not enter the debate on intellectual property rights and competition policy. There is
a wide literature investigating the anticompetitive e⁄ects of licensing agreements. For example, Fershtman
and Kamien (1992) show that cross-licensing may facilitate collusive outcomes. On the link between patent
licensing and competition policy in the EU, see for example, Anderman (1998), and for licensing agreements
in the US, see U.S. DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines (1995, 2000).
2￿rm 1 receives a ￿xed payment, but ￿rm 2 is limited in the production to a maximum level
denoted by K2.
Following Kamien (1992), we assume that, once the licensing method is selected, ￿rms
1 and 2 are involved in a three-stage game. In the ￿rst stage, the patent holder makes a
take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to the opponent indicating the licensing method and the terms of the
contract. In the second stage, the other ￿rm decides whether or not to become a licensee.
Being a licensee requires an irreversible change in the production process, i.e. ￿rm 2 can
only produce using the new technology. In the third stage, ￿rms engage in Cournot quantity
competition. The equilibrium concept is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. To solve
the model, we work backward from the third stage, ￿rst determining the product-market
equilibrium, then determining the decision of ￿rm 2, and ￿nally the o⁄er of ￿rm 1.
We brie￿ y review the ￿rst two methods that have already been investigated in the liter-
ature. Afterwards, we focus on licensing by means of a ￿xed fee with maximum authorized
production.
2.1 Royalty per unit of output licensing game
We assume that ￿rm 1 selects a constant per unit royalty rate r at which it will license the new
technology. Let qR
1 (r) and qR
2 (r) be the quantities produced in the third stage of the game by
￿rms 1 and 2, respectively, if ￿rm 2 accepts the o⁄er, and qN
1 and qN
2 these quantities if ￿rm
2 rejects the o⁄er. ￿R
1 (r), ￿R
2 (r), ￿N
1 , and ￿N
2 are the associated pro￿ts, which are similarly
de￿ned. Following Wang (1998), qR
1 (r) = (a ￿ c + r + ")=3, qR
2 (r) = (a ￿ c + r + ")=3 ￿ r,
qN
1 = (a ￿ c ￿ ")=3 + " and qN
2 = (a ￿ c ￿ ")=3. Pro￿ts are: ￿R
1 (r) = qR
1 (r)
2 + r ￿ qR
2 (r),
￿R








In the second stage, ￿rm 2 will accept the o⁄er if r ￿ " and, in the ￿rst stage, ￿rm 1
chooses r = " and maximizes its pro￿ts. Hence, the highest pro￿t level under a royalty for
￿rm 1 is ￿R
1 = (a ￿ c + 2")
2 =9 + "(a ￿ c ￿ ")=3, and the corresponding pro￿t for ￿rm 2
is ￿R
2 = (a ￿ c ￿ ")
2 =9, which coincides with its pro￿ts when it rejects the contract. The
following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 1 When ￿rm 1 selects a constant per unit royalty, it sets r = ". Pro￿ts realized
by licensing are higher than pro￿ts without licensing.
32.2 Fixed fee licensing game
When ￿rm 1 selects a ￿xed fee, the equilibrium quantity of the third stage game is given
by qF
1 = qF




￿2. The highest fee that ￿rm
1 can choose to induce the participation of ￿rm 2 is given by the di⁄erence between ￿rm






4"(a ￿ c)=9. Note that licensing the innovation is pro￿table for ￿rm 1 if a ￿ c > 3"=2:
The following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 2 When ￿rm 1 selects a ￿xed fee method it sets F = 4"(a ￿ c)=9. Pro￿ts
realized by licensing are higher than pro￿ts without licensing provided that a ￿ c > 3"=2.
The following proposition compares ￿rm 1￿ s returns from the two licensing methods.
Proposition 3 Licensing a non drastic invention by means of a unit royalty is more prof-
itable for a patentee which is involved in production than licensing by means of a ￿xed fee.
Proof. See: Wang (1998), Proposition 3.
2.3 Fixed fee with maximum output licensing game
We now assume that in the ￿rst stage of the game ￿rm 1 o⁄ers a contract to ￿rm 2 which
includes a ￿xed fee F and a maximum authorized production level K2. We assume that
￿rm 2 by accepting the contract is irrevocably committed to use the new process and cannot
produce with the previous technology. Being the competition in a Cournot-like style, the
maximum output clause is e⁄ective when K2 < qF
2 . If K2 ￿ qF
2 , then we are in the previous
case (￿xed fee without maximum authorized production), where ￿rm 2 produces qF
2 . There-
fore, we solve the third stage of the game assuming that ￿rm 2 produces qA
2 (K2) = K2 < qF
2 .
From ￿rst-order conditions, ￿rm 1 will choose to produce qA
1 (K2) = (a ￿ K2 ￿ c + ")=2.
Prepayment pro￿ts of ￿rms 1 and 2, are respectively: q1 (K2)
2 and q1 (K2) ￿ K2.
The highest fee that ￿rm 1 can charge to induce participation of ￿rm 2 is given by
the di⁄erence between ￿rm 2￿ s prepayment pro￿ts when using the new process and it is
committed to produce K2 and the pro￿ts that ￿rm 2 receives competing in a Cournot game
with the old technology:
F
max (K2) = (a ￿ K2 ￿ c + ")K2=2 ￿ (a ￿ c ￿ ")
2 =9. (1)
Thus, the overall pro￿t of ￿rm 1 is given by ￿A
1 (K2) = qA
1 (K2)
2 + F max (K2).
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Figure 1: The three licensing scheme: royalty, ￿xed fee, ￿xed fee with production constraint.
Note that this licensing method can replicate the previous cases. In particular, if ￿rm 1
sets K2 = qR







1 , and when K2 = qF








Moreover, it is simple to show that d￿A
1 (K2)=dK2 = ￿K2=2 < 0, meaning that ￿rm 1
can increase its pro￿ts by reducing the maximum authorized production.
This fact provides a clear interpretation of the result of Proposition 3. In fact, since a
royalty scheme reduces the output of the opponent with respect to a ￿xed fee, i.e. qR
2 < qF
2 ,
the royalty method produces higher pro￿ts for ￿rm 1 with respect to the ￿xed fee method
without output restrictions, i.e. ￿F
1 < ￿R
1 .
Extending this result to a more general case, it is worth noting that ￿rm 1￿ s pro￿ts are
inversely related to the output of the opponent, i.e. the lower ￿rm 2￿ s output, the higher
￿rm 1￿ s pro￿ts. Thus, when ￿rm 1 chooses the maximum authorized quantity such that
K2 < qR
2 and the ￿xed fee is equal to F max (K2), it gains more pro￿ts than under a royalty
contract.
Figure 1 depicts the optimal licensing fee depending on the maximum output licensed,
assuming that ￿rm 1 charges the ￿xed fee equal to the highest payment that induces the
participation of ￿rm 2. The largest licensing revenue corresponds to the ￿xed fee contract
without any production constraint. Reducing the maximum authorized production, the
licensing payment which ￿rm 1 can obtain decreases. When K2 = q0
2 = (a ￿ c + ")=2 ￿
5￿
(a ￿ c ￿ ")
2 =36 + (a ￿ c)"
￿2
, where 0 < q0
2 < qR
2 , the ￿xed fee is zero, and for smaller
values the licensing payment is negative. When K2 = 0, the negative payment corresponds
to the pro￿ts ￿rm 2 receives if it rejects the contract. Although the licensing payments
decrease in K2, the prepayment pro￿ts of the licensor are always su¢ cient to compensate
this reduction. The following proposition compares ￿rm 1￿ s returns from the two licensing
methods.
Proposition 4 Licensing by means of a ￿xed fee F ￿ 0 with a maximum authorized pro-
duction level K2 dominates licensing by means of a royalty, provided that q0
2 < K2 < qR
2 and









1 (K2)=dK2 = ￿K2=2 < 0, choosing K2 such that
q0
2 < K2 < qR
2 produces higher pro￿ts than licensing by means of a royalty.
Proposition 4 implies that reducing the output of the opponent increases the pro￿t of
￿rm 1. The maximum pro￿t for ￿rm 1 is when ￿rm 2 produces nothing, i.e. when F < 0.
Assuming that ￿rm 1 can not choose a negative fee, i.e. F ￿ 0, it is optimal for ￿rm 1 to
choose F = 0 and K2 = q0
2. These simple considerations show that a patent holder which
is participating in production has a strong incentive to reduce the opponent￿ s production.
This is the reason why this practice must be carefully monitored by the antitrust authority.
3 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that licensing by means of a ￿xed fee with maximum authorized
production is superior to licensing by means of a royalty per unit when the licensor is a
producer within the industry. In a Cournot duopoly model, the reduction of the licensing
revenue caused by restricting the maximum production is, in general, outweighted by direct
pro￿ts earned by the patentor as a result of larger market shares.
The strong incentive to reduce the participation of the rival with the consequence of
negative welfare implications raises important questions in terms of antitrust policy.
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